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This paper studies revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her 
buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a 
third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is inter-bidders 
resale, where the winner in the primary market resells to the losers. We show that resale 
to third parties is revenue-enhancing for the initial monopolist, whereas inter-bidders 
resale is revenue-decreasing compared to the case where resale is prohibited. 
The revenue-maximizing mechanisms in the primary market are obtained by 
investigating the optimal informational linkage with the secondary market. The results 
show that to sustain higher resale prices the monopolist may find it optimal (a) to induce 
stochastic allocations in the primary market, and (b) to design a disclosure policy that 
optimally controls for the information revealed to the participants in the secondary 
market. The optimal allocation rule and disclosure policy maximize the expected sum of 
the bidders’ resale-augmented virtual valuations, taking into account the effect of 
information disclosure on the price formation process in the secondary market. 
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Durable goods are typically traded in primary and secondary markets. Indeed, auctions for real
estates, artwork and antiques are often followed by resale. The same is true for licenses, patents,
pollution and spectrum rights. Similarly, IPOs and privatizations generate ownership structures
which evolve over time as a consequence of active trading in secondary markets.
Resale may have diﬀerent explanations. First, trade in a primary market may be followed by
resale because of the presence of new buyers in the secondary market. This occurs, for instance,
when a buyer prefers to let other agents buy in the primary market to purchase in a secondary
market. Indeed, intermediation, which is typical for example in IPOs and Treasury securities mar-
kets, may well be value-enhancing for a ﬁnal buyer.1 Alternatively, participation only to secondary
markets may be due to a change in the environment: At the time the government decides to sell
spectrum rights, a company may not bid in the auction because at that point it does not attach a
high value to the rights, possibly because of its current position in the market, or because of the
business strategy of its management. After a merger, or following a successful takeover, the same
ﬁrm may have interest in possessing the rights and decide to buy them from the winner in the
primary market.2 Finally, non-participation to primary markets may also be strategic as indicated
in McMillan (1994) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996).
Second, resale may be a direct consequence of misallocations in the primary market. As shown
ﬁrst in Myerson (1981), optimal auctions in the presence of asymmetric information are typically
ineﬃcient if bidders’ valuations are not identical. By misplacing the good into the hands of a
buyer who does not value it the most, a seller can induce more aggressive bidding and raise higher
expected revenues. However, when resale can not be prohibited, bidders will typically try to correct
misallocations in the auction by further trading in a secondary market.3
This paper studies the properties of optimal mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her
buyers to resell. Following the literature on optimal auctions (see, among others, Bulow and
Roberts (1989), Harris and Raviv (1981), Maskin and Riley (1984), Myerson (1981), Riley and
Samuelson (1981)), we assume the seller does not know the buyers’ valuations so that she has
to provide incentives for truthful revelation. Contrary to standard auction design, the allocation
in the primary market is not ﬁnal, as bidders have the option to trade in a secondary market.
As a consequence, the bidders’ valuations reﬂect the expectations of the resale outcome. Even if
bidders’ utilities from the direct possession of the good are independent, resale introduces a common
value component in the willingness to pay (see also Haile, 1999, 2001). Optimal mechanisms when
1The reader can refer also to Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) and Haile (1999) for alternative analyses of auctions
followed by resale where the set of bidders in the primary market does not include all potential buyers.
2Haile (2001) and Schwarz and Sonin (2001) develop models where bidders’ valuations change over time.
3See also Gupta and Lebrun (1999) for an analysis of First price sealed bid auctions followed by resale where trade
in the secondary market is motivated by the ineﬃciency of the allocation in the primary market.Monopoly with Resale 3
buyers are expected to resell are however diﬀerent than standard optimal auctions for common
value environments as the informational linkage between the primary and the secondary market
is endogenous and so are bidders’ valuations for the good on sale. Indeed, the price in the resale
market reﬂects the information bidders learned from the outcome of the primary market which in
turn can be fashioned by the monopolist through her choice of a disclosure policy.
To characterize the optimal informational linkage between primary and secondary markets in
a tractable way, we analyze a simple two-stage game of incomplete information. In the ﬁrst stage,
a monopolist sells a durable good in a primary market. In the second stage, the buyer in the
primary market can either keep the good for himself, or resell it in a secondary market. Bargaining
in the resale game is modelled in a reduced form where players exchange take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers
with a probability that reﬂects their relative bargaining power, as well as the level of competition
in the secondary market. Although stylized, this simple bargaining procedure suﬃces to illustrate
the dependence of the outcome in the resale market on the information disclosed in the primary
market and hence to examine the optimal informational linkage from the monopolist’s viewpoint.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we consider an envir o n m e n tw h e r et h em o n o p o l i s ts e l l st oa
buyer in the primary market who then resells to a third party who participates only in a secondary
market. Resale to third parties has two eﬀects on the monopolist’s expected revenue: ﬁrst, it
increases the value the buyers in the primary market assign to winning the good; second, it reduces
the informational rents the monopolist must leave to the bidders to induce them to truthfully reveal
their private information. As a result, resale to third parties is always revenue-enhancing for the
monopolist. In the optimal mechanism, the monopolist may induce stochastic allocations in the
primary market, for example, selling lottery tickets, using stochastic reserve prices, or inducing
buyers to follow mixed strategies. Randomizations are motivated by the fact that the allocation of
the good in the primary market is itself a signal of the buyers’ valuations. Contrary to deterministic
procedures, a stochastic allocation gives the monopolist a better control over the beliefs of the
participants in the secondary market and hence over the resale price. The optimal informational
linkage with the secondary market may also require the adoption of a disclosure policy richer than
the simple announcement of the allocation determined in the primary market. We show how the
optimal policy can be designed by introducing into a direct mechanism signals that the monopolist
sends to the participants in the secondary market as a function of the information disclosed in the
primary market.
The second part of the paper examines how to design optimal auctions when the monopolist
can contract with all potential buyers but can not forbid inter-bidders resale. To the best of
our knowledge, this problem has been examined only by Ausubel and Cramton (1999) and Zheng
(2002). Ausubel and Cramton assume perfect resale markets and show that if all gains from
trade are exhausted through resale, then it is strictly optimal for the monopolist to implement an
eﬃcient allocation directly in the primary market. The case of perfect resale markets, although an4 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
important benchmark, abstracts from a few important elements of resale. First, when bidders trade
under asymmetric information, misallocations are not necessarily corrected in secondary markets
(Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). Second, and more important, eﬃciency in the secondary
market is endogenous as it depends on the information revealed in the primary market which is
optimally fashioned by the monopolist through her choice of the disclosure policy.
Zheng assumes it is always the winner in the auction who has all bargaining power in the
secondary market and suggests a mechanism that, under standard assumptions on the distributions
of valuations supplemented by two extra conditions, gives the monopolist the same expected revenue
as in the static optimal auction when resale can be prohibited. Instead of selling to the bidder with
the highest virtual valuation, the monopolist sells to the bidder who in the secondary market is more
likely to implement the same allocation as in the optimal auction of Myerson (1981). Although
a remarkable result, Zheng’s mechanism relies on the possibility to transfer monopolistic power
from one market to the other via the allocation of the good. On the contrary, in environments
where the distribution of bargaining power in the resale game is identity-dependent, we show that
it is in general impossible to achieve Myerson’s expected revenue and hence the impossibility to
prohibit inter-bidder resale is revenue-decreasing for the monopolist. Furthermore, when this is the
case, the revenue-maximizing mechanism in the primary market may require the use of a stochastic
allocation rule and the design of an optimal disclosure policy. This can be done, in a direct revelation
mechanism, by maximizing the expected sum of the bidders’ resale-augmented virtual valuations,
taking into account the eﬀect of information disclosure on the outcome in the secondary market.
Auctions followed by resale have also been extensively examined by Haile (1999, 2001). Haile
(1999) studies the properties of equilibria of standard auction formats (First Price, Second Price
and English) when the winner in the primary market can resell in a secondary market (possibly via
another auction). Our analysis diﬀers from his in that we assume the monopolist is not constrained
to use any standard format. Also, the choice of the disclosure policy is endogenous and is obtained
as part of the monopolist’s optimal mechanism. Haile (2001) considers the performance of standard
auction formats in the presence of resale when new information about the value the bidders attach
to the good is exogenously revealed at the end of the auction. In this case, resale may occur even
if the allocation in the primary market is eﬃcient. On the contrary, we assume here the bidders
learn their ﬁnal valuations prior to participating to the primary market and the only additional
information revealed at the end of the auction is that released by the monopolist’s disclosure policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the ﬁr s tm o d eo fr e s a l ew h e r et h e
monopolist sells to a buyer in the primary market who then resells to a third party in a secondary
market. Section 3 considers the alternative mode of resale where the monopolist contracts with
all potential buyers but can not prohibit the winner in the primary market to resell to the losers.
Section 4 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.Monopoly with Resale 5
2 Resale to Third Parties
2.1 The environment
Consider a very stylized trading environment where in the primary market, a monopolistic seller
(S hereafter) trades a durable and indivisible good with a (representative) buyer, B.I fB receives
the good from S, he can either keep it for his own use, or resell it to a (representative) third party,
T, in a secondary market.4 We assume S and B can not contract, nor communicate with T at the
time they trade in the primary market.5,6
Let xi
B ∈ {0,1} represent the decision to trade between B and player i, with i = S,T. When
xi
B =1 , the good “changes hands”. For example, for i = S, xS
B =1means that B obtains the
good from S. Similarly, for i = T, xT
B =1means that T obtains the good from B. On the contrary,
if xi






, consists of the
allocation of the good xi
B and a monetary transfer ti
B ∈ R between B and player i.L e tθi be the
value of the good to player i, with i = B,T and θ := (θB,θT) ∈ Θ := ΘB × ΘT. For simplicity, we
assume the value to S is common knowledge and is normalized to zero.












We make the following assumptions on valuations.




with ∆θi := θi − θi ≥ 0, θi > 0, and Pr(θi)=pi.
A2: For any θ ∈ Θ, Pr(θ)=P r ( θB) · Pr(θT).
A3: B is the only player who knows θB and T is the only player who knows θT.
A4: θB ≤ θT and θB < θT.
Assumptions A1-A4 identify two markets in which (i) agents have discrete independent private
values, (ii) trade occurs under asymmetric information, and (iii) there are gains from trade in either
market. Assumption A4 leads to two possible cases:
A4.1: θB ≤ θT ≤ ¯ θB ≤ θT,
4We adopt the convention of using masculine pronouns for B and feminine pronouns for S and T.
5By this we mean: (a) S can not trade with T neither in the primary market nor in the secondary market; (b) S
can not ask T to report her private information and make the transaction with B contingent on T’s type; and (c)
S can disclose information to T but she can not ask her to pay for it. In addition, B and T can not contract, nor
exchange information at the time B participates to the primary market.
6Restricting the analysis to an environment with a single (representative) buyer in the primary market and a
single (representative) third party in the secondary market is for simplicity. To extend the analysis to multiple third
parties, one just needs to average the expected resale surplus for the winner in the primary market over the identities
and valuations of the many participants in the secondary market. The extension to multiple bidders in the primary
market is more interesting from a strategic viewpoint and is discussed at the end of this section.6 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
A4.2: θB ≤ ¯ θB ≤ θT ≤ θT.
In all other cases, the outcome in the resale market does not depend on the beliefs B and T
have about the rival’s valuation.
Primary Market
In the primary market S oﬀers B a contract which consists in a trading mechanism with
a disclosure policy. As proved in Pavan and Calzolari (2002), there is no loss of generality in
restricting attention to direct revelation mechanisms φS ∈ ΦS such that
φS : ΘB → R×4({0,1}×Z).
For any message θB ∈ ΘB,Bpays an expected transfer tS
B(θB) ∈ R to S a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y
φS(1,z|θB) he receives the good and information z ∈ Z is disclosed to T in the secondary market.7
We do not assign any precise meaning to the set Z at this stage, but we assume it is suﬃciently rich
to generate any desired posterior beliefs in the secondary market.8 This abstract representation
of information transmission between the two markets allows to replicate with a direct revelation
mechanism fairly general disclosure policies. The implementation of the optimal mechanisms in
the next sections will suggest possible interpretations of Z. Also note that the disclosure policy is
stochastic for two reasons. First, trade between B and S may be subject to uncertainty which may
well be reﬂected into the signal z. Second, it may be in the interest of S to commit not to fully
disclose to T the information that has been revealed in the primary market.
We also assume S is not exogenously constrained to release any information, so that disclosure
is voluntary. In the case she decides to release information, S can not charge T for the observation
of z. Finally, S can fully commit to φS but can not make the outcome in the primary market
contingent on the outcome in the secondary market.
Secondary Market
Trade between B and T in the resale market takes place according to the following simple
bargaining procedure. With probability λ, B makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to T.With probability
1 − λ, T makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to B.9 As suggested in Marx and Shaﬀer (2002), λ may
reﬂect possible uncertainty about the determinants of future bargaining power.
Timing
7Since players have quasi-linear payoﬀs, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to mechanisms φS :
ΘB → 4({0,1}×Z) × R instead of φS : ΘB → 4(R×{0,1}×Z).
8One may think of Z a sas e to fc a r d so fd i ﬀerent colors that S can disclose to T as a function of the outcome
determined in the primary market. That Z is suﬃciently rich to generate any desired beliefs for player T leads to
the most favorable case for S. As we prove in Lemma 1, in this environment with a discrete number of players and
types, without loss of optimality, Z is a ﬁnite set.
9Assuming the two players make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers instead of using more general mechanisms is without loss
of generality in this simple environment with two players, quasi-linear preferences, private values and discrete types
(Maskin and Tirole, 1990, Prop. 11). Hence, one can interpret λ also as the probability a player is the mechanism
designer in the resale market.Monopoly with Resale 7
Reject 
S offers B a 
mechanism 
S φ   B 
All players enjoy their 
reservation utilities 
Accept 
T makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to B 
B makes a take-
it-or-leave-it 
offer to T 
t=1  t=2 




λ − 1  
Probability λ  
 




B x  
1 =
S
B x  
Game 
over 
Figure 1: The trading game
• At t =1 ,Spublicly announces a selling mechanism φS ∈ ΦS,w h e r eΦS is the set of all
possible feasible (direct) mechanisms.10 If B rejects φS, the game ends and all players enjoy
their reservation payoﬀs which are normalized to zero. If φS is accepted, B pays an expected
transfer tS
B(θB) to S a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yφS(1,z|θB) he receives the good and information
z ∈ Z is disclosed to T in the secondary market.
• At t =2 , if xS
B =1 , bargaining between B and T occurs according to the simple procedure
described above. Otherwise, the game is over.
Figure 1 summarizes the trading environment.
2.2 The outcome in the secondary market
The game described in Section 2.1 can be solved by backward induction examining ﬁrst how the
outcome in the secondary market is inﬂuenced by the information discl o s e di nt h ep r i m a r ym a r k e t .
• T ﬁxes the price.
10Pavan and Calzolari (2002) formally prove that assuming S publicly announces her mechanism is without loss of
generality. It is important to note that although T can observe the mechanism φS, she does not observe its realization.8 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan




φS(1,z|¯ θB)pB + φS(1,z|θB)(1 − pB)
.
Note that, even if T does not directly observe whether B has obtained the good, she can
always make her oﬀer contingent on the event xS
B =1 ; indeed, trade between B and T in the
secondary market can occur only if B received the good from S in the primary market. For




¯ θB if Pr(¯ θB|xS
B =1 ,z) ≥ ∆θB
θT−θB,
θB if Pr(¯ θB|xS
B =1 ,z) < ∆θB
θT−θB,
If T oﬀers B ap r i c etT
B(θT,z)=¯ θB, she receives the good with certainty with a surplus
equal to θT − ¯ θB. On the contrary, by oﬀering θB, T saves on the price, but trade occurs
i fa n do n l yi fθB = θB. Hence, a high price is preferable for T if and only if θT − θB ≥
(θT − θB)Pr(¯ θB|xS
B =1 ,z), or equivalently Pr(¯ θB|xS
B =1 ,z) ≥ ∆θB
θT−θB. The price tT
B(θT,z) is
thus increasing in θT and in Pr(¯ θB|xS
B =1 ,z). The surplus B obtains from reselling to T is
















0 if Pr(¯ θB|xS
B =1 ,z) < ∆θB
θT−θB
,
−pT∆θB if Pr(¯ θB|xS








−∆θB if Pr(¯ θB|xS
B =1 ,z) ≥ ∆θB
θT−θB.
• B ﬁxes the price.
Let tT
B(θB) ∈ ΘT be the price B asks T when he has value θB for the good he purchased in












11In the case T is just indiﬀerent between oﬀering a high and a low price, we assume here she oﬀers a high price.
In addition, we assume B sells to T when he is indiﬀerent between accepting T’s oﬀer and retaining the good. Such
assumptions simplify the exposition in this section, but are not crucial for any of the results.
12We assume B asks T a low price when he is just indiﬀerent between asking θT and θT. Furthermore, we assume T
a c c e p t st ob u yw h e ns h ei si n d i ﬀerent. Once again, these assumptions are introduced just in this section to simplify
the exposition and are not crucial for any of the results.Monopoly with Resale 9
Since T does not participate in the primary market, there is no information S can disclose
to B about T’s value for the good. By asking θT,Bobtains θT − θB with certainty. On the
contrary, by asking ¯ θT, trade occurs if and only if T has a high valuation. Asking a low price
is then optimal if and only if θT − θB ≤ pT(¯ θT − θB); the price tT
B(θB) is thus increasing in





¯ θT − θB if tT
B(θB)=¯ θT, and θT = ¯ θT,
θT − θB if tT
B(θB)=θT,
0 otherwise.




− EθT [sB(θB,θT)] ∈ [−∆θB,0], with
∆sB =

   
   

















2.3 The optimal mechanism in the primary market
At t =1 ,Santicipates the outcome in the secondary market and designs a mechanism φS ∈ ΦS
which solves the following program.
PS :

             














θB + λsB +( 1− λ)rB(z)
ª
− tS




φS(1,z|θB){θB + λsB +( 1− λ)rB(z)} − tS













φS(1,z|θB){θB + λsB +( 1− λ)rB(z)} − tS
B(θB). (IC)
The ﬁrst two constraints are individual-rationality constraints and guarantee B is willing to accept
the contract φS. The last two are incentive-compatibility constraints and guarantee B has the right
incentives to reveal his type.
Given the equilibrium outcome in the resale (sub)game, there is no loss of generality in assuming
S discloses only three signal, say zl with l =1 ,2,3, such that
tT
B(θT,z 1)=¯ θB for any θT,
tT
B(θT,z 2)=θB for any θT,
tT
B(θT,z 3)=¯ θB i fa n do n l yi fθT = ¯ θT.10 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
Indeed, suppose S discloses two signals that induce T t om a k et h es a m eo ﬀer in the resale market.
One can replace them with a single signal that has probability equal to the sum of the probabilities
of the two signals and which induces the same outcome in the secondary market. The formal
argument is in Lemma 1. Let #φSZ be the cardinality of the subset of Z which is in the range of
φS,
#φSZ := #{z ∈ Z : φS(1,z|θB) > 0 for some θB ∈ ΘB}.
Lemma 1 For any mechanism φS such that #φSZ>3, there exists another mechanism φ0
S such
that #φ0
SZ =3which is payoﬀ-equivalent for all players.
Using Lemma 1, one can simplify PS. We show that the optimal mechanism for S can be
analyzed in terms of resale-augmented virtual valuations,w h i c ha r ed e ﬁned as the sum of the
standard virtual valuations, as in Myerson (1981), along with the (endogenous) payoﬀ that each
type expects from resale, conditional on the information disclosed in the primary market.
Deﬁnition 1 Let V (θB|zl) be the resale-augmented virtual valuation for a buyer with private value
θB, conditional on S disclosing information zl to T in the secondary market. We have
V (θB|zl): =θB + λ¯ sB +( 1− λ)rB(zl),


















for l =1 ,...,3.
Since the high type does not expect any surplus from resale if it is T who makes the oﬀer in
the secondary market, V (θB|zl)=θB + λ¯ sB for any zl. Furthermore, as we prove in Lemma 2, the
high type can always guarantee himself at least the same payoﬀ as the low type by announcing θB.
Hence, θB must be given a price discount (informational rent) to truthfully report his type in the
primary market. This discount depends on the probability of receiving the good by announcing
θB, as well as the payoﬀ diﬀerential between the high and the low types, which is a function of the




φS (1,z l|θB)[∆θB + λ∆sB +( 1− λ)∆rB(zl)].
For each signal zl, the resale-augmented virtual valuation of type θB is then simply the diﬀerence
between the (endogenous) surplus θB expects from buying the good, and the discount S must oﬀer
13UB(θB) is obtained by setting (IC) and (IR) binding. The proof is in the Appendix — Lemma 2.Monopoly with Resale 11










1−pB∆θB if zl = z1,







if zl = z3,
we have that V (θB|z1) ≥ V (θB|z3) ≥ V (θB|z2).
The optimal selling mechanism for S is obtained by choosing an allocation rule and a disclosure
policy that maximize the probability of the signals associated with the highest resale-augmented
virtual valuations, taking into account the eﬀect of disclosure on the outcome in the secondary
market.











[∆θB + λ∆sB +( 1− λ)∆rB(zl)] ≥
P3




B =1 ,z 1) ≥ ∆θB
θT−θB, (1)
Pr(¯ θB|xS












Constraints (1)−(3) guarantee that, given the mechanism φ∗
S and information zl, it is sequen-
tially optimal for T to follow the equilibrium strategy in the secondary market. Constraint (IC)
guarantees that the low type does not gain from mimicking the high type. Note that, contrary








l=1 φS (1,z l|θB) only when λ =1 , in which case the outcome in the primary
market has no eﬀect on the resale price. The remaining constraints, (IC), (IR) and (IR) are
embedded into the reduced program via the resale-augmented virtual valuations.
In the following Proposition, we use Lemma 2 to characterize the optimal mechanism in the
primary market. For simplicity, we report only the results for the case A4.1. The results under
A4.2 are similar and are omitted for brevity. Under A4.1, T always oﬀers B a low price when she
has a low valuation. In this case, there are no signals z1 that can result in tT
B(θT,z 1)=¯ θB for any
θT and hence φ∗
S(1,z 1|θB)=φ∗
S(1,z 1|¯ θB)=0 .
Proposition 1 Let J(θT): =
pB(θT−θB)




assumptions A1-A4.1, the revenue-maximizing mechanism in the primary market is the following.12 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan










1 if V (θB|z3) ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.




















0 if V (θB|z2) < 0,
[∆θB+λ∆sB−(1−λ)pT∆θB][1−J(θT)]
∆θB+λ∆sB if V (θB|z2) ∈ [0,K V(θB|z3)],




J(θT) if V (θB|z3) ≥ 0 and V (θB|z2) ≤ KV(θB|z3),
0 otherwise.
In all cases, the possibility for B to resell to T in the secondary market is revenue-enhancing
for the monopolist.
The optimal mechanism is such that S sells with certainty to B when the latter has a high
valuation. As far as the low type is concerned, the probability to trade depends on the asymmetry of
information in the primary market, as well as the expected resale surplus in the secondary market.
This, in turn, depends on the price T is ready to oﬀer and hence reﬂects the information disclosed
in the primary market. When J(θT) ≥ 1, ¯ θT oﬀers B a high price in the case she learns nothing
from the primary market. This is clearly the most favorable case for S who then sells to either type
provided that V (θB|z3) ≥ 0.
Things are more diﬃcult for the monopolist when J(θT) < 1. In this case, T oﬀers B al o wp r i c e
when the information she receives from the primary market does not result in a signiﬁcant change
of her prior beliefs. S can then try to sustain a higher expected resale price by disclosing some
information to T. However, this comes at a cost. Because of incentives reasons, when S discloses
information, she has to sacriﬁce the possibility to trade with the low type with certainty. To see
this, suppose trade occurs with probability one with either type. In this case, the price discount
for the high type would be UB(θB)=∆θB + λ∆sB − pTφ∗
S (1,z 3|θB)(1− λ)∆θB. But then if the
low type pretends he has a high valuation, he gets
UB(θB) −
£



















as information z3 leads to a high price in the secondary market if and only if φ∗






. Faced with the trade-oﬀ between selling with higher probability or sustaining higherMonopoly with Resale 13
resale prices, S ﬁnds it optimal to favor the probability to trade when V (θB|z2) >KV(θB|z3),
that is when the low type has a high virtual valuation even when T oﬀers him a low price. On the
contrary, when V (θB|z2) is positive but less than KV (θB|z3), the optimal mechanism consists in
selling with probability φ∗
S (1,z 2|θB)+φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB) < 1 to the low type and disclosing information












,Ssends information z3 with certainty when B has a high valuation. Furthermore,
as φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB) is bounded above by J(θT) < 1, it is optimal for S to trade with B also with the
other (less favorable) signal z2:t h a t i s ,φ∗
S (1,z 2|θB) > 0. However, as indicated above, to sort






< 1, and the upper bound on
φ∗
S (1,z 2|θB) is determined by (IC).
Finally, when V (θB|z2) < 0, but V (θB|z3) > 0,Sﬁnds it optimal to trade with θB only when
the expected resale surplus is high, which occurs if and only if information z3 is disclosed to T.I n
this case, φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB)=J(θT), and φ∗
S (1,z 2|θB)=0 .
That the monopolist beneﬁts from allowing B to resell to T follows directly from the examina-
tion of the virtual valuations. First, resale enables S to use B as an intermediary, or a middleman,
to extract surplus also from T in the secondary market. Indeed, the price in the primary market
incorporates the surplus B expects from trading in the resale market. Second, resale reduces the
informational rent the monopolist has to leave to the high type by decreasing his comparative ad-
vantage with respect to the low type (recall that ∆sB and ∆rB(zl) are negative, for any l =1 ,...,3).
As a consequence, the possibility for B to resell to T is revenue-enhancing for S.14
The next proposition suggests a possible implementation for the optimal mechanism.
Proposition 2 The optimal mechanism of Proposition 1 has the following implementation.
1. If J(θT) ≥ 1,Smakes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to B at a price
τ =
(
¯ θB + λ¯ sB if V (θB|z3) < 0,
θB + λsB +( 1− λ)pT∆θB otherwise.
2. If J(θT) < 1 and V (θB|z2) < 0,Soﬀers B two prices,
τH =
(
¯ θB + λ¯ sB if V (θB|z3) < 0,
¯ θB + λ¯ sB − J(θT)(∆θB + λ∆sB − (1 − λ)pT∆θB) otherwise.
τL =
(
0 if V (θB|z3) < 0,
J(θT)[θB + λsB +( 1− λ)pT∆θB] otherwise.
B receives the good with certainty if he pays τH. If, on the contrary, he pays τL he receives
t h eg o o dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yJ(θT) if V (θB|z3) ≥ 0 and with probability zero otherwise.
14The formal argument is in the proof of Proposition 4 where we generalize this result to primary markets with
multiple bidders.14 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
3. If J(θT) < 1, and V (θB|z2) ∈ [0,K V(θB|z3)],Breceives the good with certainty if he pays
τH = ¯ θB + λ¯ sB − [φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB)+φ∗
S (1,z 2|θB)](∆θB + λ∆sB)+
+( 1− λ)φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB)pT∆θB.




S(1,z3|θB)if he pays τL = δ [θB + λsB]. T h eh i g ht y p ep a y sτH.
The low type pays τH with probability φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB) and τL with probability 1 − φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB).
4. If J(θT) < 1, and V (θB|z2) >KV(θB|z3),Smakes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to B at a price
τ = θB + λsB
In all cases but 2, it is optimal for S to disclose the price B pays in the primary market.
To create the optimal informational linkage with the secondary market, the monopolist has
two natural instruments: First, she can sell to the two types with diﬀerent probabilities so that the
decision to trade becomes itself a signal of the buyer’s valuation. Second, she can disclose the price
B pays in the primary market.
When J(θT) ≥ 1, S sells to either type at a price τ = θB+λsB+(1− λ)pT∆θB if V (θB|z3) ≥ 0,
and only to the high type at a price τ = ¯ θB + λ¯ sB otherwise. In either case, disclosing the price
has no eﬀect on the seller’s expected revenue.
Suppose now J(θT) < 1.W h e n V (θB|z3) < 0,Ssells only to the high type at a price τ =
¯ θB + λ¯ sB and hence disclosing the price is again revenue-neutral. When instead V (θB|z3) ≥
0, the optimal disclosure policy depends on the sign of V (θB|z2). If V (θB|z2) < 0, the optimal
informational linkage is obtained by giving B the possibility to pay a high price τH and receive
the good with certainty, or a low price τL and receive the good with probability J(θT) < 1.I nt h e
continuation game, the high type is indiﬀerent and in equilibrium pays τH, whereas the low type
strictly prefers τL. In this case, the price B pays conveys too much information about B’s type
and hence must be kept secret.
When V (θB|z2) ≥ 0, but V (θB|z2) <KV(θB|z3),Soﬀers B two prices, τH and τL. If B pays
τH, he receives the good with certainty, whereas if he pays τL with probability δ. Contrary to the
previous case, since in equilibrium θB receives the good with probability J(θT)+[ 1− J(θT)]δ>
J(θT), the decision to trade is no longer suﬃcient to induce θT to oﬀer θB in the resale game.
In this case, it becomes necessary for S to disclose also the price and use it as a signal of B’s
valuation. In the continuation game, θB pays τH whereas θB randomizes paying τH with probability
φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB)=J(θT). Given B’s strategy, it is sequentially optimal for θT to oﬀer a high price when
she observes τH and a low price otherwise, making θB just indiﬀerent between the two prices.
Finally, in case 4, S oﬀers B a single price that either type accepts to pay and which, without
any eﬀect on the revenue, is made public.Monopoly with Resale 15
Note that to create the optimal informational linkage S may need to combine lotteries with
mixed strategies. This happens precisely in case 3. Suppose, for example, that S tries to make B
randomize over two prices τL and τH with τL <τ H without using lotteries, i.e. by selling with
certainty with either price. In this case, the high type, who does not care about the information
disclosed to T, will always pay the low price τL. But then, anticipating that T will never oﬀer
a high price if she observes τH, the low type will also pay τL. To avoid this outcome, S must
associate τL with a lottery. Similarly, suppose S tries to implement the optimal informational
linkage without making B play a mixed strategy. If S separates the two types15 and discloses the
prices, she perfectly informs T about B’s valuation, which is clearly not optimal. If, on the other
hand, she separates the two types and keeps the price secret, then the only thing S can do to
sustain a high resale price is to associate τL with a lottery that gives the good with probability at
most equal to J(θT). On the contrary, by disclosing the price and making B randomize over τH
and τL, S can induce a high resale price with the same probability and at the same time sell to θB
with probability J(θT)+[ 1− J(θT)]δ, which in case 3 leads to a higher expected revenue.
Due to the presence of asymmetric information, the revenue-maximizing mechanism for the
monopolist may induce ineﬃcient allocations in either market. The ineﬃciency in the primary
market comes from the fact that S may ﬁnd it optimal to retain the good with positive probability.
The ineﬃciency in the secondary market arises when T oﬀers too little, and/or B asks too high a
price. Whereas this latter possibility is not inﬂuenced by the outcome in the primary market, the
price T oﬀers depends on the disclosure policy selected by the monopolist. It is then interesting to
investigate how ex ante eﬃciency (i.e. the probability the good is allocated to the player who values
it the most) is inﬂuenced by λ, i.e. by the distribution of bargaining power in the secondary market.
Assume A4.1 holds. From Proposition 1, trade in the primary market always occurs if B has a
high type. On the contrary, trade with the low type depends on the value of the resale-augmented
virtual valuations, V (θB|z2) and V (θB|z3), which can be either increasing, or decreasing in λ. As
indicated above, ineﬃcient allocations in the secondary market arise when T oﬀers too little and/or





< 1 i.e. when J(θT) < 1 and
V (θB|z2) >KV(θB|z3), the second when pT >
θT−θB
¯ θT−θB
); it follows that eﬃciency in the secondary
market may also increase or decrease with λ. We can conclude that ex-ante eﬃciency is typically
non monotone in the distribution of bargaining power in the secondary market.
The optimal mechanism in Proposition 1 has been obtained assuming in the primary market
S and B do not collude at the expenses of T. Collusion possibilities arise from the fact that S
could publicly announce a mechanism φS and then sign a secret side contract with B so that she
discloses only the most favorable signals with probability one.16 When S lacks of the commitment
15In the sense θB (respectively, θB)p a y sτH (τL) with probability one, with τH 6= τL.
16An alternative form of collusion that one can envision in the absence of full commitment is between S and T.16 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
not to privately renegotiate φS with B, the only credible information that can be disclosed to the
participants in the secondary market is the decision to trade. Furthermore, without commitment,
the possibility for S to make φS public has no strategic eﬀect so that φS must be itself a best
reply to the strategy T is expected to follow in the secondary market. As in the case with full
commitment, the optimal mechanism in the primary market can be designed by looking at the





be the probability T oﬀers B a high price in the secondary market. Without commitment, no
signals are disclosed to T and the (collusion proof) resale-augmented virtual valuations reduce to
V (θB|ξ): =θB + λ¯ sB,


















The seller’s optimal (collusion-proof) mechanism then simply maximizes US := EθB [V (θB|ξ)φS(1|θB)]
under the monotonicity condition φS(1|θB) ≥ φS(1|θB).17 It is important to note that even when
S can not commit to a credible disclosure policy, the endogenous informational linkage between
the two markets does not vanish. Indeed, the decision to trade in the primary market represents
valuable information for T and is reﬂected in the equilibrium resale price. Moreover, stochastic
(collusion-proof) mechanisms may be optimal also without commitment. Suppose, for example,
A4.1 holds, so that T oﬀers a low price when she has a low valuation and hence ξ ∈ [0,p T]. Assume
J(θT) < 1, meaning that θT also oﬀers a low price in the case she learns nothing from the allocation
of the good in the primary market. When V (θB|ξ =0 )< 0 and V (θB|ξ = pT) > 0, the equilibrium
is in mixed strategies with θT oﬀering a high price with probability ¯ ξ
∗ ∈ (0,1) and S selling to θB
with probability J(θT) and to θB with certainty.18
2.4 Multiple bidders
Consider now a primary market where S sells to one out of N bidders who then resells to a
representative third party who does not participate in the primary market. This corresponds to an
environment where S can prohibit inter-bidders resale, but is not able to contract with all potential
buyers at the time she needs to sell. Without any loss of generality, let N =2and denote the two
bidders by B1 and B2. We will refer to Bi as a generic bidder and to Bj as his rival, with i =1 ,2
and j 6= i. At the end of the auction, the winner may keep the good for himself or resell it to T in
This would lead to the ratchet-eﬀect results highlighted in the literature of dynamic contracting. In this paper, we
have ruled out this form of collusion by assuming there are no means by which S can contract with T at any time.
17A complete characterization of the optimal collusion-proof mechanism for S is available upon request.
18The equilibrium ¯ ξ
∗ solves V (θB|pT¯ ξ
∗)=0 .I nt h i sc a s e ,S is just indiﬀerent between selling to either type or to
t h eh i g ht y p eo n l ya n di ne q u i l i b r i u ms h es e l l st oθB with probability J(θT) and to θB with certainty. Given φS, θT
is also indiﬀerent between oﬀering a high or a low price and in equilibrium she randomizes with probability ¯ ξ
∗.Monopoly with Resale 17
the secondary market, in which case the bargaining game is exactly as above with λi denoting the
relative bargaining power of Bi with respect to T.











A2’: (Independent private values) For any θ :=( θ1,θ2,θT) ∈ Θ := Θ1 × Θ2 × ΘT, Pr(θ)=
Pr(θ1) · Pr(θ2) · Pr(θT).
A3’: Player i is the only player who knows θi.Tis the only player who know θT.
A4’: θi ≤ θT and θi < θT for i =1 ,2.
An outcome in the primary market is now deﬁned by (xS,tS),w h e r e
xS := (xS
1,x S









denotes the allocation of the good, and tS =( tS
1,t S
2) ∈ R2 the proﬁle of transfers from B1 and B2
to S. A (direct) mechanism is a mapping
φS : ΘB → R2 × ∆(XS × Z).
When the two bidders announce valuations θB := (θ1,θ2) ∈ ΘB := Θ1 × Θ2, with probability
φS(xS,z|θB) the allocation is xS ∈ XS and information z ∈ Z is disclosed to T.W e a s s u m e S
can fully commit to φS.F r o m L e m m a1 ,S does not need to use more than three signals: signal
z1 represents information such that tT
i (θT,z 1)=¯ θi for any θT, signal z2 information such that
tT
i (θT,z 2)=θi for any θT, and signal z3 information for which tT
i (θT,z 3)=¯ θi if and only if
θT = ¯ θT, where tT
i is the resale price T pays bidder i.
Proposition 3 An optimal auction in the primary market maximizes the expected sum of the bid-
ders’ resale-augmented virtual valuations, taking into account the eﬀect of disclosure on the outcome



















i =1 ,z 1) ≥ ∆θi
θT−θi, (i.1)
Pr(¯ θi|xS


















i =1 ,z l|θi,θj
¢








i =1 ,z l|θB,θj
¢
[∆θi + λi∆si +( 1− λi)∆ri(zl)]
o (ICi)18 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
for i =1 ,2 and j 6= i.
The only diﬀerence with respect to the single bidder case is that now S compares the two
bidders’ resale-augmented virtual valuations for each state θB. However, note that contrary to
standard auction design, in the presence of resale, S does not necessarily assign the good to the
bidder with the highest (resale-augmented) virtual valuation. Indeed, this would be the case if
the resale price were exogenous. When, instead, the price in the secondary market depends on
the information disclosed in the primary market, S may ﬁnd it optimal to assign the good to a
bidder with a lower resale-augmented virtual valuation in state θB if this allows to relax constraints
(i.1)−(i.3) and increase the probability of selling to a bidder with a high virtual valuation in another
state θ0
B. Assume, for example, that in state θB =( θ1,θ2),V(θ1|zj) >V(θ2|zl) for any j and l.
If constraint (2.1) in Proposition 3 is binding, assigning the good to B2 in state θB =( θ1,θ2) is
more eﬀective in relaxing (2.1) than assigning the good to B1. By giving the good to B2 in state
θB, S can then increase the probability of selling to B2 with signal z1 or z3 in state θ0
B =( θ1,θ2),
which in turn may result in a higher expected revenue if the probability of state θB is relatively low
compared to that of state θ0
B and if V (θ2|zl) − V (θ1|zl) are high compared to V (θ1|zl) − V (θ2|zl)
for l =1 ,3. We will see in Section 3 that similar incentives for (virtual) misallocations arise in the
case of auctions followed by inter-bidders resale.
Comparing the expected revenue of the optimal auction of Proposition 3 with the maximal
expected revenue S could obtain absent the possibility for B1 and B2 to resell to T in the secondary
market gives the following result.
Proposition 4 A monopolist beneﬁts from the existence of a secondary market when (a) she can
not contract with all potential buyers, and (b) she can prohibit the winner in the primary market
to resell to the losers.
Resale to third parties has two eﬀects: ﬁrst, it increases the value the bidders in the auction
assign to winning the good; second, it reduces the comparative advantage of the high types with
respect to the low types and hence the informational rents S must leave to the bidders to induce
them to truthfully reveal their private information. As a result, resale to third parties is always
revenue-enhancing for the monopolist. As indicated in Proposition 4, this result however depends
on the possibility for the monopolist to prevent the losers to purchase in the secondary market.
As we show in Section 3, when this assumption is relaxed, a bidder may underbid in the auction
to signal he has a low valuation to the winner and then receive an oﬀer at a lower price in the
secondary market. In this case, extracting information from the bidders becomes more costly than
in the absence of a secondary market and, as a consequence, inter-bidders resale may well lead to
a loss of expected revenue for the monopolist.
Apart from the inter-bidders comparisons of the resale-augmented virtual valuations, the pro-
gram in Proposition 3 is very similar to that for the single bidder case as in Proposition 1. Hence,Monopoly with Resale 19
instead of further characterizing the properties of the optimal auction for this environment, we
move directly to the study of optimal auctions for the case where resale takes place among the
same bidders who participate in the primary market.
3 Inter-Bidders Resale
In this section we consider the second mode of resale, where the winner in the primary market resells
to the losers. The monopolist can not prohibit resale. To highlight the eﬀects of inter-bidders resale
on optimal auction design, we also assume there are no third parties in the secondary market.19
Bargaining in the resale game takes place according to the simple procedure described in Section
2, i.e. each bidder ﬁxes the resale price with probability λi.20 Before deriving the optimal auction
in this environment, we ﬁr s ti l l u s t r a t et h ee ﬀect of inter-bidders resale on two other mechanisms
examined in the literature.
Myerson Auction
Assume S designs an optimal auction àl aM y e r s o n , i.e. an auction which gives the good to
the bidder with the highest virtual valuation M(θi), where M(θi): =¯ θi and M(θi): =θi −
pi∆θi
1−pi ,
with i =1 ,2. Suppose Θ1 and Θ2 are such that θ2 ≤ θ1 and θ2 < θ1.21
When M(θ1) ≥ M(θ2), the allocation rule is eﬃcient and consists in selling the good to B1 at a
price equal to θ1. In this case, the impossibility to prevent resale does not have any bite since there
are no gains from trade in the secondary market. Suppose on the contrary that M(θ1) <M (θ2).
If S uses a Myerson auction and bidders can resell, the ﬁnal allocation in the secondary market
may diﬀer from the one which maximizes the monopolist’s expected revenue. Assume, for example,
that M(θ1) ≤ M(θ2). Myerson auction prescribes that θ1 should always win and pay θ1,w h e r e a s
θ1 should never receive the good. As far as B2 is concerned, θ2 should receive the good if and only
if B1 has a low valuation. Furthermore, if M(θ2) ≥ 0, then θ2 should also receive the good if and
only if θ1 = θ1. A simple way to implement this allocation rule is to ﬁx two personalized reserve
prices respectively equal to θ1 for B1 and θ2 for B2 and use any auction format which assigns the
good to the player who submits the highest bid.
When bidders have the possibility to resell, this auction is no longer a truthful mechanism as
B1 can simply decide not to buy (equivalently announce any bid below θ1) and purchase in the
resale market at a price lower than θ1. Indeed, the equilibrium in this game is for player B2 to pay
θ2 and receive the good with certainty and for B1 to bid less than θ1 and lose the auction with
19A model embedding both modes of resale (inter-bidders and to third parties) would combine the results of this
section with those derived in Section 2.
20Equivalently, each bidder oﬀers a mechanism with probability λi. As in Section 2, restricting attention to take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀers is without loss of generality in this quasi-linear environment with two bidders and discrete types.
21This assumption is the analog of A4 in the previous section.20 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
probability one. In this case, the revenue in the auction falls from p1θ1 +(1−p1)θ2 to θ2 and thus
the possibility for the bidders to resell results in a loss of expected revenue for the monopolist.
Zheng Auction
Zheng (2002) recently proposed an alternative optimal mechanism which is designed to replicate
Myerson’s expected revenue in an environment where inter-bidders resale can not be prohibited.
We sketch here the main idea. Assume it is always the winner in the primary market who ﬁxes
the price in the secondary market and let M(θ1) ≤ M(θ2). Zheng optimal auction prescribes that
S should simply sell to B2 at a price equal to p1θ1 +( 1− p1)θ2 and use B2 as a middleman to
extract surplus from B1 in the secondary market. Since in this case B2 asks a price θ1 independently
of his valuation (indeed, M(θ1) ≤ M(θ2) implies p1 >
θ1−θ2
¯ θ1−θ2 for any θ2 ∈ Θ2), through resale S
can implement the same ﬁnal allocation as in Myerson optimal auction where resale is not allowed.
Furthermore, since either bidder receives zero surplus when he has a low valuation, from the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem, this mechanism generates the same expected revenue as the static optimal
auction without resale.
Although a remarkable result, Zheng optimal mechanism relies upon the possibility for S to
transfer bargaining power from a bidder to the other through the allocation of the good in the
primary market. Suppose, on the contrary, that the distribution of the bargaining power in the
resale game is a function of the identity of the two bidders. In this case, it is in general impossible
to implement an allocation rule that assigns the good to B2 with certainty when θB =( θ1,θ2).
Whenever B1 has some bargaining power in the secondary market (in our model λ1 > 0), he will
always oﬀer at least θ2 and therefore trade will ultimately transfer the good to B1 with positive
probability. In this case, the impossibility to prohibit resale may well result in a loss of expected
revenue for the initial seller, as we show in this section. Furthermore, the optimal auction in the
primary market may require the use of a stochastic allocation rule and the design of an optimal
disclosure policy to create the desired informational linkage with the secondary market.
Optimal auction design
As in Section 2.4, let the allocation of the good in the primary market be represented by a
vector xS := (xS
1,x S
2) ∈ XS, with xS
i =1when bidder i wins the auction. The payoﬀ of Bi is now
ui = θixS
i (1 − xr)+θixS
j xr − tS
i + tr, where xr =1if the good changes hands in the secondary
market, and xr =0otherwise. tr denotes the resale price and is positive if Bi is the winner in
the primary market and negative otherwise. Finally, z := (z1,z2) ∈ Z := Z1 × Z2 represents the
information S privately discloses to the two bidders at the end of the auction.22
Consider ﬁrst the outcome in the secondary market when Bi wins the auction and makes the
price in the resale game. If θi > maxΘj,B i retains the good. On the contrary, if θi ≤ maxΘj,B i
22Implicitly, we are assuming there are no exogenous constraints that oblige S to disclose any information apart
from xS. Hence, by examining the case where S sends private (possibly correlated) signals to B1 and B2, we are de







¯ θj if Pr(θj|xS




i =1 ,zi,b θi) ≤
θj−θi
¯ θj−θi.
T h er e s a l ep r i c etr(θi,b θi,xS
i =1 ,zi) depends on bidder i’s type and his beliefs about bidder j’s
valuation; these in turn are a function of the allocation in the primary market, xS
i =1 , the
information S discloses to Bi, zi, and the behavior Bi followed in the auction, b θi.G i v e n a t y p e






¯ θj − θi if tr(θi,b θi,xS
i =1 ,zi)=¯ θj and θj = ¯ θj,
θj − θi if tr(θi,b θi,xS
i =1 ,zi)=θj,
0 otherwise.
The surplus for Bj is
rj(θi,θj|b θi,xS




∆θj if tr(θi,b θi,xS
i =1 ,zi)=θj,
0 otherwise.
Next, consider the case where Bj wins the auction and Bi makes the price in the secondary market.
Clearly, Bi does not make any acceptable oﬀer when θi ≤ minΘj. On the contrary, when this
inequality is reversed, Bi oﬀers a price tr(θi,b θi,x S






¯ θj if Pr(¯ θj|xS
j =1 ,zi,b θi) ≥
∆θj
θi−θj,
θj if Pr(¯ θj|xS
j =1 ,zi,b θi) <
∆θj
θi−θj.






θi − ¯ θj if tr(θi,b θi,x S
i =1 ,zi)=¯ θj,
θi − θj if tr(θi,b θi,x S
i =1 ,zi)=θj and θj = θj,
0 otherwise.




∆θi if tr(θi,b θi,x S
j =1 ,zi)=θj,
0 otherwise,
rj(θi,¯ θj|b θi,x S
j =1 ,zi)=0 .
23That Bi asks (oﬀers) a low (high) price when indiﬀerent between θj and θj is not crucial for any of the results.22 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
In what follows, we adopt the convention of referring to si(θB|xS
h =1 ,zi) and rj(θB|xS
h =1 ,zi) as
the equilibrium resale surplus of bidder i (respectively j) in state θB, conditional on Bi making the
price in the secondary market and bidder h winning the auction, with i =1 ,2,h=1 ,2, and j 6= i.
Formally, si(θB|xS
h =1 ,zi)=si(θB|b θi,x S
h =1 ,zi) and rj(θB|xS
h =1 ,zi)=rj(θB|b θi,x S
h =1 ,zi) for
b θi = θi. Note that conditional on Bi receiving information zi, the resale surplus si(θB|xS
h =1 ,zi)
and rj(θB|xS
h =1 ,zi) does not depend on the behavior of bidder j in the auction, b θj.
To be individually rational and incentive compatible, an auction followed by inter-bidders resale

































h =1 ,z|b θi,θj) − tS
i (b θi,θj)
o (ICi)
for any (θi,b θi) ∈ Θ2
i, i =1 ,2, where I(h = i) is the indicator function, assuming value one if h = i
and zero otherwise. As in Section 2, constraints (IR)i and (IC)i must be binding in an optimal
auction. This also implies that (IR)i are veriﬁed.
Deﬁnition 2 Let
Vi(θi,θj|xS































be the resale-augmented virtual valuations of bidder i, r e s p e c t i v e l yw h e nh eh a sah i g ha n dal o w
valuation, conditional on bidder j having valuation θj and bidder h winning the auction, for h = i,j.
As in the case where resale is to third parties, a revenue-maximizing auction followed by inter-
bidders resale can be designed by choosing an allocation rule and a disclosure policy that maximize
the expected sum of the bidders’ resale-augmented virtual valuations, taking into account the
eﬀect of disclosure on the resale outcome and ICi. From Lemma 1, there is no loss of generalityMonopoly with Resale 23
in restricting attention to disclosure policies that map a proﬁle of announcements θB into three
possible signals for each bidder. Given each signal zi
l with l =1 ,...,3, bidder i does not ask (oﬀer)
any acceptable price when xS
i =1and θi > maxΘj (respectively, xS
j =1and θi < minΘj). Signal
zi
1 stands for information that induces either type of bidder i to ask (oﬀer) either a high or a non
acceptable price. Signal zi
2 induces either type to ask (oﬀer) either a low or a non acceptable price.
Finally, signal zi
3 represents information for which a high type does not ask (oﬀer) a low price and
a low type does not ask (oﬀer) a high price.



























































for any θi ∈ Θi, with i =1 ,2 and j 6= i.
Constraints (S.1)−(S.3) and (B.1)−(B.3) in Proposition 5 control for the sequential optimality
of a bidder’s behavior in the resale game, respectively when Bi is a seller (xS
i =1 ) and a buyer
(xS
j =1 ). They guarantee that resale prices are sequentially optimal on and oﬀ the equilibrium
path. For example, assume θ2 < θ2 <θ 1 < θ1 and suppose xS
2 =1 . Given the announcement θ2 in
the auction, signal z2
3 stands for information that on the equilibrium path induces B2 to ask a low
price and oﬀ equilibrium a high price. Similarly, given the announcement θ1,s i g n a lz1
1 represents
information that induces B1 to oﬀer a high price in the resale game, independently on whether he
truthfully reported his type in the auction. Clearly, since φS is incentive-compatible, no deviations
take place in equilibrium.
The following is a direct implication of Proposition 5.
Remark 1 (Revenue equivalence theorem for auctions with resale – two-type case).24 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
Any two truthful revelation mechanisms φS and φ0
S in which the (IR) and (IC) constraints are
binding, respectively for the low and the high types of each bidder, are revenue equivalent if they
are characterized by the same allocation rule and the same disclosure policy, i.e. if φS(xS,z|θB)=
φ0
S(xS,z|θB) for any xS, z and θB.
When bidders have the option to resell, two mechanisms that generate the same allocation in
the primary market are revenue-equivalent if they also induce the same disclosure of information.24
Note that the version of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem in Remark 1 is in terms of the allocation
in the primary market; an alternative version can be stated in terms of the ﬁn a la l l o c a t i o ni nt h e
secondary market. The two versions are clearly equivalent. Indeed, the mechanism in Proposition
5 implicitly characterizes the ﬁnal allocation in the secondary market and imposes constraints for
this allocation to be resale-implementable.
In what follows, we study the properties of the optimal auction in the two polar cases where
one of the two bidders has full bargaining power in the secondary market, i.e. λi =1for i =1 ,2.
The purpose for restricting the analysis to the polar cases is twofold. First, they are particularly
tractable.25 Second, it suﬃces to look at these two polar cases to see that: (1) inter-bidders resale is
never revenue-enhancing and typically leads to a loss of expected revenue for the monopolist26;a n d
(2) the optimal mechanism in the primary market may require the use of a stochastic allocation rule
— Proposition 7 — and the design of an optimal disclosure policy to create the desired informational
linkage with the secondary market.
For simplicity, and in analogy with the previous sections, we report only the results for the
case where θ2 ≤ θ1 ≤ ¯ θ2 ≤ θ1. In this case, if B1 wins the auction, he retains the good when he
has a high valuation and makes an oﬀer to B2 at a price θ2 otherwise. Similarly, when B1 wins the
auction, B2 oﬀers a price equal to θ1 if he has a high valuation and does not make any acceptable
oﬀer otherwise. It follows that the resale price and the surplus in the secondary market is not
inﬂuenced by the information disclosed in the auction when it is B1 the winner in the primary
market. Hence, without loss of optimality, S does not disclose any signal to either bidder when the
allocation of the good is xS
1 =1 .
The next proposition presents an optimal auction for the polar case where it is B2 who has full
24The reader can refer to Haile (1999) for a comparison of the performance of standard auction formats (English,
First price sealed bid, Second price sealed bid) in the presence of resale.
25Deriving the optimal auction for all possible parameters’ conﬁgurations is not an easy task: the program in
Proposition 5, although linear, has seventy two control variables and one hundred and ten constraints (including
feasibility constraints).
26That the expected revenue of any auction followed by inter-bidders resale is never higher than in a Myerson static
optimal auction where resale is prohibited is immediate when the monopolist can contract with all potential buyers.
That S strictly suﬀers from the impossibility to prevent inter-bidders resale is however not obvious in the light of the
recent literature (see, for example, Zheng, 2002).Monopoly with Resale 25
bargaining power in the secondary market.27





1 =1 )=M(θ1) −
p2






1. Assume max{v1,v 2} ≥ 0.
(i) If v1 ≤ v2,Ssells the good to B2 with probability one.
(ii) If v1 >v 2, S sells to B2 if θB=( θ1,θ2) and to B1 otherwise.
2. If max{v1,v 2} < 0,B 2 wins the auction if one of the two bidders has a high valuation.
Otherwise, S retains the good.
Without loss of optimality, S discloses only the identity of the winner.
The impossibility to prohibit inter-bidders resale is revenue-decreasing for the monopolist.
Consider ﬁrst case 1. When v1 ≤ v2, p1 >
θ1−θ2
¯ θ1−θ2
, meaning that B2 always asks B1 ah i g hp r i c e
if he learns nothing from the outcome in the primary market. If M(θ1) ≤ M(θ2), the possibility
for the bidders to resell does not hurt the monopolist. Indeed, S can simply sell to B2 at a price
p1θ1+(1−p1)θ2 which is the same expected revenue as in a Myerson static optimal auction without
resale. Suppose, on the contrary, that M(θ1) >M (θ2). In the static optimal auction, S assigns
the good to B2 if θB =( θ1,θ2) and to B1 otherwise; this allocation can be achieved, for example,
through a second price sealed bid auction with reserve prices28, respectively for B2 and B1, equal to
θ2 and θ1 (the expected revenue of the static optimal auction is thus p2θ2+(1−p2)θ1). Now assume
S runs a Myerson auction when bidders can resell. In this case, θ2 is strictly better oﬀ by losing the
auction (bidding strictly less than θ2) and then purchasing from B1 (in the event the latter has a
low valuation) at a price θ1. It follows that the expected revenue falls from p2θ2+(1−p2)θ1 to θ1. As
we prove in Proposition 6, the best S c a nd oi st h e ns e l l i n gt oB2 at a price equal to p1θ1+(1−p1)θ2
when 0 ≤ M(θ1) − M(θ2) ≤
p2
1−p2(θ2 − θ1) –i . e .v1 ≤ v2 – and running a second price auction
with common reserve price θ1, when the second inequality is reversed. In the ﬁrst case, B2 always
asks B1 a high price in the secondary market and hence when θB =( θ2,θ1) the good remains in the
hands of B2, contrary to what prescribed in the static optimal auction. The impossibility to prevent
resale results in a loss of expected revenue equal to p2θ2 +( 1− p2)θ1 − [p1θ1 +( 1− p1)θ2] > 0.29
27The optimal allocation rule in the primary market is not unique. This explains the qualiﬁer "an optimal auction..."
in the statement of Proposition 6. A similar non-uniqueness result holds for Proposition 7.
28A second price sealed bid auction with personalized res e r v ep r i c e si sam e c h a n i s mw h i c ha l l o c a t e st h eg o o dt o
the bidder who submits the highest acceptable bid at a price equal to the maximum between the second highest
acceptable bid and the winner’s reserve price.
29Note that the possibility to resell would not bite if the (re)seller had always full bargaining power in the secondary
market. In this case, S could simply sell to B1 at a price p2θ2 +( 1− p2)θ1, as indicated in Zheng 2002.26 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
In the second case, the ﬁnal allocation is exactly as in Myerson, but the expected revenue is just
p1p2θ2 +( 1− p1p2)θ1 instead of p2θ2 +( 1− p2)θ1.30
In the presence of resale, the optimal allocation rule in the primary market is not unique. For
example, when 0 ≤ M(θ1)−M(θ2) ≤
p2
1−p2(θ2−θ1),s e l l i n gt oB2 with certainty for all θB 6=( θ1,θ2),





and to B1 with the complementary
probability when θB =( θ1,θ2) is also optimal. In this case, when B2 wins the auction, his posterior
beliefs that B1 has a high valuation are suﬃciently high to induce him to always ask a high price
in the secondary market so that the ﬁnal allocation and the expected revenue are exactly the same
as when S sells to B2 with probability one.






< 0.I nt h i sc a s e ,S sells to
B2 if θB6=( θ1,θ2) and retains the good otherwise. When M(θ1) ≤ 0, the impossibility to prohibit
resale does not result in a loss of expected revenue. On the other hand, when M(θ1) > 0 >M(θ2),
S must withhold the good when θB=( θ1,θ2), whereas this would not be necessary if bidders
could not resell. The problem with resale is that if S sells to B1 when θB=( θ1,θ2), she has to
increase the rent for θ2 by (1 − p1)(θ2 − θ1), which is suboptimal when p2(1 − p1)(θ2 − θ1) >
(1−p1)(1−p2)M(θ1),i . e .w h e nM(θ1)−
p2
1−p2(θ2−θ1) < 0. On the contrary, without resale, selling
to B1 when θB=( θ1,θ2) increases the rent for θ1 by (1 − p2)∆θ1, but has no eﬀect on the rent
for θ2:h e n c e ,i fp1(1 − p2)∆θ1 < (1 − p1)(1 − p2)θ1,i . e .i fM(θ1) > 0, trade always occurs in the
primary market.
The following presents an optimal auction for the other polar case where B1 has all bargaining
power in the resale market.










3) and J(θ1): =
p2(θ1−θ2)
(1−p2)∆θ2.
1. Suppose ﬁrst J(θ1) ≥ 1. For θB=( θ1,θ2) and θB=( θ1,θ2),B 1 wins the good. For θB=( θ1,θ2),
B2 wins if v2 (θB) ≥ 0, or if Eθ2 [v2 (θ1,θ2)] ≥ 0. Otherwise, S retains the good. For
θB=( θ1,θ2),B 1 wins if v1 (θB) ≥ 0 and p1 <p 2.B 2 wins if v2 (θB) ≥ 0, p1 ≥ p2 and
Eθ2 [v2 (θ1,θ2)] ≥ 0. In all other cases, S retains the good.
2. Assume now J(θ1) < 1. For θB=( θ1,θ2) and θB=( θ1,θ2),B 1 is the winner. For θB=( θ1,θ2),
30That the ﬁnal allocation is the same as in the Myerson static optimal auction and yet the expected revenue is
lower is not in contrast with the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. Indeed, if one considers the entire convex hull of
t h et y p es p a c eΘB,i naM y e r s o na u c t i o nB2 receives the good only if θ2 = θ2, whereas in the optimal auction with
resale of Proposition 6 for any θ2 ≥ θ1. Hence, although the two mechanisms are characterized by the same ﬁnal
allocation rule on the equilibrium path (i.e. for θB ∈ ΘB), they do not give B2 and B1 the same rents, and thus are
not revenue equivalent for S. We thank Charles Zheng for pointing this out to us.Monopoly with Resale 27











Otherwise, S retains the good. For θB=( θ1,θ2),B 1 wins if v1 (θB) ≥ 0 and p1 <p 2,h e
receives the good with probability 1 − J(θ1) if v1 (θB) ≥ 0 and p1 ≥ p2, and never wins
otherwise. B2 receives the good with probability J(θ1) if
v2 (θB) ≥ max
½









and loses in all other cases.
Without loss of optimality, S discloses only the identity of the winner.
The impossibility to prohibit inter-bidders resale is revenue-decreasing for the monopolist.
Assume M(θ1) ≤ M(θ2) and M(θ2) ≥ 0. Myerson static optimal auction prescribes S should
assign the good to B1 when the latter has a high valuation and to B2 otherwise. In the absence
of resale, this allocation can be achieved, for example, through a ﬁrst price sealed bid auction
with personalized reserve prices equal to θ1 for B1 and θ2 for B2. On the contrary, when resale
can not be prohibited and B1 has some bargaining power, it is no longer possible to implement
an allocation rule that assigns the good to B2 with probability one when both bidders have a low
valuation. Starting from this observation, Proposition 7 exhibits an optimal auction for λ1 =1 .A
few properties of the optimal mechanism are worth being highlighted. First, as in the case λ2 =1 ,
the impossibility to prevent inter-bidders resale typically results in a loss of expected revenue for
the initial seller. For example, contrary to the static optimal auction, it is impossible for S to
extract the full surplus from B1 when he has a high valuation, unless S commits not to sell to B2,
which is in general suboptimal. Second, contrary to the case where it is B2 who has full bargaining
power, the optimal auction may require the use of a stochastic allocation rule. As in Section 2, this
happens exactly when J(θ1) < 1, i.e. when B1 oﬀers B2 a low price in the event he learns nothing
from the outcome of the primary market. To sketch the intuition for the optimality of a stochastic
allocation rule, suppose S designs a mechanism that assigns the good to B1 when the latter reports
a high valuation and to B2 otherwise. In this case, if θ1 announces θ1 i nt h ea u c t i o n ,h eo ﬀers
B2 a low price in the resale market; to induce him to truthfully reveal his type,Smust then give
him a rent at least equal to (1 − p2)∆θ1. On the contrary, by selling to B2 with probability J(θ1)
and to B1 with the complementary probability when θB=( θ1,θ2), S induces θ1 to oﬀer a high
price after losing the auction when announcing θ1. In this case, the rent S has to give to θ1 is
p2(θ1 − θ2)+( 1− p2)[J(θ1)∆θ1 +( 1− J(θ1))(∆θ1 − ∆θ2)], which is smaller than (1 − p2)∆θ1 for
J(θ1) < 1.28 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
A ﬁnal remark concerns the optimal disclosure policy. In either Proposition 6 and Proposition
7, the optimal informational linkage between the two markets can be implemented by disclosing
only the identity of the winner. This result is, however, speciﬁc to the two polar cases. When both
bidders have some bargaining power in the secondary market, creating the desired informational
linkage only through the design of an optimal (stochastic) allocation rule is, in general, not feasible.
In fact, even if a certain allocation rule induces the right posterior beliefs for one bidder, it is unlikely
that the same rule also induces the desired beliefs for the other. When this is the case, S may gain
by disclosing to the bidders more information than the simple identity of the winner. In particular,
the optimal disclosure policy may require the announcement of the winning price or, more generally,
of statistics of the bids submitted in the auction31.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In primary markets where buyers have the option to resell, bidders’ valuations reﬂect the expec-
tations of future gains from trade in the secondary market. The outcome in the resale market
is also endogenous as it depends on the information disclosed in the primary market. Starting
from this observation, the paper has suggested a simple model to examine the revenue-maximizing
mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. Although stylized, the analysis has
indicated a few important elements of resale.
First, a monopolist beneﬁts from the existence of secondary markets when (a) she can not
contract with a potential buyer in the primary market and (b) she can prohibit the winner to
resell to the losers. Second, in order to sustain higher resale prices, the monopolist must create an
optimal informational linkage with the secondary market. This may require the use of stochastic
allocations as well as the design of an optimal disclosure policy.
All the results in the paper have been derived using a simple two-bidder two-type model.
Although this is clearly not without loss of generality, we believe the properties of the results,
as well as the methodology used to characterize the optimal mechanisms, extend to richer envi-
ronments. For example, the idea that the optimal allocation rule and disclosure policy can be
designed supplementing standard direct revelation mechanisms with abstract signals to control for
the informational linkage with the secondary market extends to cases with N bidders and M types.
Similarly, the fact that the optimal mechanisms maximize the sum of the bidders’ resale-augmented
virtual valuations, taking into account the eﬀect of disclosure on resale outcomes, is not speciﬁct o
the two-bidder two-type model. On the other hand, characterizing the properties of optimal mech-
anisms in environments where the bidders’ valuations have a continuous distribution is in general
more diﬃcult as the cardinality of the signal space is not always well deﬁned.
A last remark concerns the foundations for secondary markets. In this paper we have assumed
31Simulations for the general program of Proposition 5 when λi ∈ (0,1),i=1 ,2 conﬁrm this intuition.Monopoly with Resale 29
resale occurs as a result of (i) the impossibility for the monopolist to contract with all potential
buyers, and (ii) the possibility for the bidders to correct misallocations in the primary market by
further trading in a secondary market. Extending the analysis to environments where resale is a
consequence of endogenous changes in bidders’ valuations represents an interesting line for future
research.
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5A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
















B(θT,z)=¯ θB i fa n do n l yi fθT = ¯ θT
ª
.
Suppose S replaces φS with a mechanisms φ0
S that maps ΘB into lotteries that assign positive
m e a s u r et oa tm o s tt h r e es i g n a l s ,i . e .#φ
0
S
Z =3 . Without loss of generality, let these three signals
be labelled by zl with l =1 ,...,3. Construct φ0







for l =1 ,...,3. The mechanism φ0




B(θT,z 1)=¯ θB for any θT,
tT
B(θT,z 2)=θB for any θT,
tT
B(θT,z 3)=¯ θB i fa n do n l yi fθT = ¯ θT.Monopoly with Resale 31
This is true if given φ0
S
Pr(¯ θB|xS
B =1 ,z 1) ≥ ∆θB
θT−θB,
Pr(¯ θB|xS




















S(1,z l|θB)pB + φ
0







φS(1,z|θB)pB + φS(1,z|θB)(1 − pB)
¤.








it follows that Pr(¯ θB|xS
B =1 ,z 1) ≥ ∆θB
θT−θB. Repeating the same argument for z2 and z3 gives the
result.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is in two steps. First, we reduce PS by showing that in the optimal mechanism (IR)
and (IC) constraints are binding, which also implies that (IR) is satisﬁed. Second, we express the
reduced program for φS in terms of resale-augmented virtual valuations. Using the expressions for
UB(θB) and UB(θB), (IC) and (IC) can be written as
UB(θB)+
P3







[∆θB + λ∆sB +( 1− λ)∆rB(zl)].




φS (1,z l|θB)[∆θB + λ∆sB +( 1− λ)∆rB(zl)].
That is, (IC) and (IR) are binding. Furthermore, as ∆θB + λ∆sB +( 1− λ)∆rB(zl) ≥ 0 for any
















l=1 φS (1,z l|θB)[θB + λsB +( 1− λ)rB(zl)]
into PS and (IC) and using the expressions for the resale-augmented virtual valuations as in
Deﬁnition 1, gives the result. Constraints (1) − (3) guarantee that given the mechanism φS and32 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
the posterior beliefs associated with each signal zl for l =1 ,...,3, it is sequentially optimal for T to
follow the equilibrium strategy in the resale market.
Proof of Proposition 1
Take the program for the optimal mechanism as in Lemma 2. Under A4.1, constraint (1) can
be neglected. Constraints (2) and (3) can be written as
φS(1,z 2|θB) ≥ J(θT)φS(1,z 2|¯ θB), (2)
φS(1,z 3|θB) ≤ J(θT)φS(1,z 3|θB). (3)
• Consider ﬁrst the case in which J(θT) ≥ 1, meaning that θT oﬀers B a high price when
she receives no information from the primary market. Since V (θB|z3) ≥ V (θB|z2), and










1 if V (θB|z3) ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
Constraint (IC) is clearly satisﬁed in this case.
• Next consider the case where J(θT) < 1. The solution depends on the value of V (θB|z2). If










J(θT) if V (θB|z3) ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
Again, constraint (IC) is satisﬁed.







S (1,z 3|θB)=J(θT), and φ∗
S (1,z 2|θB)=1− φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB). However, in this case, given the
price discount for the high type, UB(θB)=∆θB + λ∆sB − (1 − λ)φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB)pT∆θB, it
becomes attractive for the low type to pretend he has a high valuation and get
UB(θB)−[∆θB + λ∆sB − (1 − λ)pT∆θB]=( 1− λ)pT[1−φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB)]∆θB > 0=UB(θB).
Hence, (IC) must be binding, i.e.
[∆θB + λ∆sB]
P3
l=2 φS (1,z l|θB) − [(1 − λ)pT∆θB]φS (1,z 3|θB)=












We proceed ignoring (2), and then show it is satisﬁed at the optimum. Given any φS(1,z 3|θB) ∈
[0,1], it is optimal to set φS(1,z 2|θB)=1 −φS(1,z 3|θB). Indeed, US is increasing in φS(1,z 2|θB)
and maximizing φS(1,z 2|θB) relaxes (IC) and hence allows S to increase φS (1,z 2|θB). AtMonopoly with Resale 33
the optimum, constraint (3) must also bind. If not, S could increase φS(1,z 3|θB) and de-
crease φS (1,z 2|θB) enhancing US and relaxing (IC). Using (3) and (IC),w eh a v et h a tUS is
increasing in φS(1,z 3|θB) i fa n do n l yi f
J(θT)V (θB|z3) −
·
[∆θB + λ∆sB − (1 − λ)pT∆θB]J(θT)+( 1− λ)pT∆θB
∆θB + λ∆sB
¸
V (θB|z2) ≥ 0,
or, equivalently V (θB|z2) ≤ KV(θB|z3), where
K :=
[∆θB + λ∆sB]J(θT)
[∆θB + λ∆sB]J(θT)+[ 1− J(θT)](1 − λ)pT∆θB
.






S (1,z 3|θB)=J(θT), and φ∗
S (1,z 2|θB)=
[∆θB+λ∆sB−(1−λ)pT∆θB][1−J(θT)]







1 if V (θB|z2) >KV(θB|z3). Since constraint (2) is satisﬁed in either case, this proves the
result.
Finally, that S beneﬁts from the possibility for B to resell to T follows from Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 2
In what follows we give the proof for the case J(θT) < 1, and V (θB|z2) ∈ [0,K V(θB|z3)]. In
all other cases the proof is immediate and hence is omitted.
Let z3 = τH = tS
B(θB) and z2 = τL and assume S discloses the price. Given the equilibrium
mixed strategy of player B, it is optimal for T to oﬀer θB when she observes τH and θB when she
observes τL. Now assume T follows the equilibrium strategy in the resale market. For the low type
to be indiﬀerent between τH and τL, it must be that
θB + λsB +( 1− λ)pT∆θB − τH = δ [θB + λsB] − τL.
Since τH = tS
B(θB), t h el e f th a n ds i d ei sa l s oe q u a lt ot h ep a y o ﬀ θB obtains from announcing θB
in the direct mechanism of Proposition 1, which is equal to zero because IC and IR are binding in
the optimal contract. As a consequence, τL = δ [θB + λsB].
The value of δ is then obtained by imposing δ[1−φ∗
S (1,z 3|θB)] = φ∗
S (1,z 2|θB) which guarantees
that the indirect mechanism of Proposition 2 induces the same distribution over xS
B and Z as the
direct mechanism of Proposition 1.





− τL. Using the values of δ and τL, this equality is equivalent to
UB(θB)=[ ∆θB + λ∆sB − (1 − λ)pT∆θB],34 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
which holds true since IC and IR are binding in the optimal contract.
Since the mechanism in Proposition 2 induces the same distribution over xS
B and Z as the
direct mechanism of Proposition 1 and gives B the same expected payoﬀ, it follows that it also
induces the same expected transfers from B to S.
Proof of Proposition 3
An optimal auction solves
Ps :
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Following Lemma 2, one can show that it is optimal to have (IR)i and (IC)i binding for i =1 ,2.
In this case, constraints (IR)i are also satisﬁed. Substituting transfers from (IR)i and (IC)i into
US and (IC)i and using the expressions for the resale-augmented virtual valuations of Deﬁnition 1
gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 4
To prove the claim, we compare the expected revenue associated with the optimal auction in
the presence of resale, as in the program of Proposition 3, with the maximum expected revenue S
could achieve absent the possibility for B1 and B2 to sell to T in a secondary market, – i.e. as in
a Myerson optimal auction with bidders B1 and B2. Recall that for any type proﬁle θB, Myerson
allocation rule consists in assigning the good to the bidder with the highest virtual valuation, M(θi),
when maxi=1,2 {M(θi)} ≥ 0, and in withholding the good otherwise. The expected revenue of a
Myerson optimal auction is thus EθB [max{0,M (θ1),M (θ2)}], where M(¯ θi): =¯ θi and M(θi): =
θi −
pi
1−pi∆θi,f o ri =1 ,2.
The proof is in two steps. The ﬁrst proves that for any θi ∈ Θi and signal zl, the resale-
augmented virtual valuations of either bidder are higher than the corresponding Myerson virtual
valuations; that is, V (θi|zl) ≥ M(θi) for any l =1 ,...,3 and i =1 ,2. This follows directly from
Deﬁnition 1, ∆si ∈ [−∆θi,0], and ∆ri(zl) ∈ [−∆θi,0] for l =1 ,...,3.
The second step proves that Myerson allocation rule is feasible and incentive compatible also
in the presence of resale. To see this, assume S adopts a disclosure policy that reveals to TMonopoly with Resale 35
only the identity of the winner. Formally, conditional on Bi winning the auction, S sends to T
always the same signal, independently of whether Bi has announced a low or a high type so that
Pr(¯ θi|xS
i =1 ,z l)=P r ( ¯ θi|xS
i =1 ) . The particular signal zl S sends to T depends on the value of
Pr(¯ θi|xS
i =1 )associated to Myerson allocation rule; that is, z = z1 if Pr(¯ θi|xS
i =1 )≥ ∆θi
θT−θi,z= z2
if Pr(¯ θi|xS
i =1 )< ∆θi
θT−θi








. Such a disclosure policy
trivially satisﬁes constraints (i.1)−(i.3). Furthermore, since Myerson allocation rule is monotonic,
constraints (IC)i are also satisﬁed and hence Myerson allocation rule is implementable also in the












i =1 ,z l|θB
¢

 ≥ EθB [max{0,M (θ1),M (θ2)}],
which gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 5
To write the seller’s expected revenue in terms of resale-augmented virtual valuations it suﬃces
to recover the expected transfers from the four binding constrains (ICi), (IRi) i =1 ,2 and substi-







. Using Lemma 1, one can then show that for each proﬁle
of announcements θB ∈ ΘB, there is no loss of optimality in assuming S sends to each bidder just
three signals. Constraints (S.1) − (S.3) and (B.1) − (B.3) control for the sequential optimality of
a bidder’s behavior in the resale game, respectively when xS
i =1and xS
j =1 .
Proof of Proposition 6
When λ2 =1 , constraints S.1-S.3 and B.1-B.3 for i =1do not have any bite on the solution
of the program in Proposition 5 and thus can be eliminated. Furthermore, since S does not
need to disclose any information to B1 we drop the presence of z1








l |θB), for any l =1 ,...,3.
When θ2 ≤ θ1 ≤ ¯ θ2 ≤ θ1, there are no signals z2
2 that can induce either type of bidder 2
to ask a low price in the secondary market; that is φS(xS
2 =1 ,z2
2|θB)=0for any θB∈ ΘB. As
indicated in Proposition 5, the optimal auction φ∗
S then maximizes the expected sum of the bidders’
resale-augmented virtual valuations subject to (ICi),i=1 ,2, and the constraints on the sequential
optimality of B2’s strategy in the resale game, S.1 and S.3 for i =2 . Substituting for the resale-
augmented virtual valuations as in Deﬁnition 2 and using the expressions for the Myerson virtual36 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
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1−p2(θ2−θ1) ≤ M(θ2), then φ∗
S(xS
2 =1 ,z2
1|θB)=1for any θB∈ ΘB is optimal
(note that M(θ1) −
p2
1−p2(θ2 − θ1) ≤ M(θ2) implies
p1∆θ1
(1−p1)(θ1−θ2) ≥ 1 so that all constraints


























(ii) If M(θ1) −
p2

















< 0.I nt h i sc a s e ,S retains the good when
θB=( θ1,θ2). If
p1∆θ1
(1−p1)(θ1−θ2) ≥ 1, then φ∗
S(xS
2 =1 ,z2
1|θB)=1for any θB6=( θ1,θ2) is optimal. If
on the contrary
p1∆θ1











In all cases, since at most one signal is disclosed for each θB, announcing only the identity of the
winner is suﬃcient to implement the desired informational linkage with the secondary market.
That inter-bidders resale is revenue-decreasing for the monopolist follows directly from the
impossibility for S to achieve the same expected revenue as in the Myerson static optimal auction
for all possible parameters’ conﬁgurations.
Proof of Proposition 7
When λ1 =1 , constraints S.1-S.3 and B.1-B.3 for i =2can be eliminated. Furthermore, since
S does not need to disclose any information to B2 as it is always B1 who makes the price in the
secondary market, we drop the presence of z2







m|θB), for any l =1 ,...,3.
Since θ2 ≤ θ1 ≤ ¯ θ2 ≤ θ1, there are no signals z1
1 that can induce θ1 to oﬀer a high price to B2
in the secondary market when xS
2 =1 ;t h a ti sφS(xS
2 =1 ,z1
1|θB)=0for any θB∈ ΘB. The optimal
auction φ∗
S then maximizes the expected sum of the bidders’ resale-augmented virtual valuations
subject to (ICi),i=1 ,2, and the constraints on the sequential optimality of the resale price B1
oﬀers B2 in the secondary market, B.2 and B.3 for i =1 . Substituting for the expressions for the


















































































































, (B.3)38 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
respectively for θ1 = ¯ θ1 and θ1 = θ1,
p2
¡¯ θ1 − θ2
¢£
φS(xS

























+(1− p2)(∆θ1 − ∆θ2)[φS(xS
2 =1 ,z1














































, θB=(θ1,θ2) are linked









the two incentive compatibility constraints (IC1) and (IC2).
• Suppose ﬁrst J(θ1) ≥ 1.



















– from B.2 – it also relaxes (IC2).
Furthermore, it implies (IC1) is always satisﬁed and thus can be neglected.32
2. For θB=( θ1,θ2), and θB=( θ1,θ2), constraint B.2 is necessarily binding. If not, one can
always reduce φS(xS
2 =1 ,z1
2|θ1,θ2) and increase φS(xS
1 =1 |θ1,θ2) increasing US and
relaxing (IC2).
3. Without loss of optimality, φ∗
S(xS
2 =1 ,z1
2|θB)=0for θB=( θ1,θ2) and θB=( θ1,θ2). To
see this, take ﬁrst the case where θ2−
p1
1−p1
¡¯ θ1 − θ2
¢
≥ 0 so that S always sells the good








¡¯ θ1 − θ2
¢¸¾
J(θ1)−1+




































3|θB)=1for θB=(θ1,θ2), and θB=(θ1,θ 2).
Nevertheless, selling to B1 in these two states is more eﬀective in relaxing (IC1) than selling to B2. This also implies
that when (IC1) does not bind at the optimum, the optimal allocation rule need not be unique.Monopoly with Resale 39
we have that ∆US
∆φS(xS
2 =1,z1
2|θ1,θ2) ≤ 0. Hence, any mechanism where φS(xS
2 =1 ,z1
2|θB) > 0




Next, assume θ2 −
p1
1−p1
¡¯ θ1 − θ2
¢
< 0. In this case, (IC2) must also bind as otherwise






and increase US without violating B.3 which is
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¢¸¾
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it follows that ∆US
∆φS(xS
2 =1,z1




2|θB)=0for θB=( θ1,θ2) and θB=( θ1,θ2).







=1is clearly optimal when θ2−
p1
1−p1
¡¯ θ1 − θ2
¢
≥ 0,




¡¯ θ1 − θ2
¢
































or, equivalently, Eθ2 [v2 (θ1,θ2)] ≥ 0. In either case, without loss of optimality, φ∗
S(xS
1 =
1|θ1,θ2)=0 . The solution for θB=( θ1,θ2) then follows from the previous steps.
• Suppose now J(θ1) < 1. In this case (IC2) can be neglected as, as we show below, it is never
binding at the optimum.






=1is again payoﬀ maximizing. This
also implies (IC1) is always satisﬁed.
2. For θB=( θ1,θ2), and θB=( θ1,θ2), constraint B.2 is necessarily binding. The argument
is the same as for J(θ1) ≥ 1.40 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
3. Without loss of optimality, φ∗
S(xS
2 =1 ,z1
2|θB)=0for θB=( θ1,θ2) and θB=( θ1,θ2). To
prove this, consider ﬁrst the case where θ2 −
p1
1−p1
¡¯ θ1 − θ2
¢
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we have that ∆US
∆φS(xS
2 =1,z1
2|θ1,θ2) ≤ 0 so that it is (weakly) optimal to set φ∗
S(x2 =
1,z1
2|θB)=0 . Next assume θ2 −
p1
1−p1
¡¯ θ1 − θ2
¢
< 0. In this case, B.3 is always binding.
If














2|θ1,θ2) < 0. If, on the contrary, the left hand side in the above









∆θ2 > 0, a n di nt h i sc a s e
one can reduce φS(xS
2 =1 ,z1







¡¯ θ1 − θ2
¢
≥ 0, i.e. if v2(θ1,θ2) ≥ 0, then φ∗
S(xS
2 =1 ,z1
3|θ1,θ2)=1 .I f ,o nt h e
other hand, θ2 −
p1
1−p1
¡¯ θ1 − θ2
¢





























¡¯ θ1 − θ2
¢i
≥ 0,









≥ 0. In either case, there is no loss
of optimality in setting φ∗
S(xS
1 =1 |θ1,θ2)=0 . The solution for θB=( θ1,θ2) then follows
from that for θB=( θ1,θ2).
In all cases, since for each θB the monopolist discloses at most one signal, the optimal disclosure
policy can be implemented announcing only the identity of the winner.
The suboptimality of inter-bidders resale follows directly from the impossibility for S to achieve
the same expected revenue as in the Myerson static optimal auction for all possible parameters’
conﬁgurations. 
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